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In June 1900, the elderly Queen Victoria recorded in her diary a 
conversation with her Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, about 
the forthcoming federation of the British colonies in Australia. T 
rather objected to the name Australian Commonwealth', she wrote, 
'and would have preferred Dominion'. But Chamberlain assured his 
sovereign that 'it did not imply anything like a Republic, quite the 
reverse'. The Australians simply 'did not like having the same name 
as the Canadians'.^ So the Commonweahh of Austraha was called 
into being with Edmund Barton as its first Prime Minister. 
For his part. Barton proclaimed the Commonwealth as meaning 
that a nation had come to occupy the continent. But 'Toss-pot Toby', 
as he was known, was a century too early. As Chamberlain assured 
Queen Victoria, it was not a nation that had been created at 
federation, but a state that remained a subservient dominion of 
Britain. Whereas a nation primarily exists as a state of mind, a state 
primarily exists as a matter of law. As the British historian, Hugh 
Seton-Watson, once observed, a nation only exists 'when an active 
and fairly numerous section of its members are convinced that it 
exists'.' In 1901, that was not the case in Austraha. 
Unlike the formal apparatus of a state, with its parliament and 
police, you can not legislate a nation into being and, as Joseph Stalin 
found, neither can you bludgeon it out of existence. A nation exists 
in the minds of its members. Although nations often exist congruent 
with a state of the same name, it is not uncommon to find them 
existing independent of any state or a number of nations co-existing 
within the boundaries of a single state. The Kurds would be one 
example of a nation existing across state boundaries while the old 
Yugoslavia provided an example of several nations existing within the 
boundary of a single state. Indonesia is another example of this. And 
it could be argued that Austraha is yet another, with the Aboriginal 
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nation co-existing with the European nation which can in turn be 
broken down into a number of other nations. 
In fact, rather than being a 'nation of tribes' as Geoffrey Blainey 
would have us, it would be more accurate to describe modern Australia 
as a patchwork of nations co- existing under the cover of a federal 
state, with many of its migrant peoples retaining an abiding sense of 
their separate nationhood. Pohcies of assimilation and the processes 
of citizenship saw so-called new Australians pay lip service to an 
English queen while retaining their original passports in the bottom 
drawer of their dressers. At the same time, many British Australians 
declined to confirm their citizenship as Australians. 
No wonder that Australia has been for much of its modern history 
a nation of bolters, a people with divided loyalties ready to leave 
Australia if the going got tough or they were beckoned by the cultural, 
historical or geographical attractions of 'home', whether it be London, 
Rome or Athens. As Seton-Watson pointed out, there can be no nation 
without a large number of people believing in its existence and, by 
implication, identifying themselves as Australians first. The problem 
with multi-culturalism in a society with a weak and confused sense 
of nationhood, is that it has encouraged people to think of therhselves 
as Austrahans second. On the other hand, concessions to 
muhiculturalism have weakened the dominance of Australian society 
by British Australians and thereby helped to provide the mental space 
for the current republican debate. 
While postwar Australia was opening its arms to European 
migrants, other former European colonies were being wracked by 
nationalist revolts. Unlike Australians, supporters of these nationalist 
movements could define themselves distinctly from the people of the 
metropolitan power, being people with a history, culture, language, 
religion and race different from that of the imperial power. In contrast, 
Australian society was to a large extent merely a microcosm of the 
British society from which it had largely sprung, with its people 
hampered in their development of a national consciousness by having 
a confused allegiance — to the country in which they lived, to the 
empire of which it was a minor part and to the country of origin of 
themselves, or their parents. 
In such circumstances, the idea of Britain, and particularly England, 
as 'home' was a long time dying in the Australian psyche. It was openly 
regarded as 'home' during the first half of this century even by British 
Australians after several generations of their forebears had lived in 
Australia. W.S. Robinson, the prominent Australian businessman and 
adviser to Billy Hughes in the First World War and Dr Evatt in the 
Second World War, wrote as late as 1963 of being unable to 'think 
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or refer to Britain as other than "Home"'." Robert Menzies was also 
a good example of this, with a boyhood in the bush being succeeded 
by quick elevation to the Australian prime ministership and then a 
thwarted attempt to transfer his talents to the British House of 
Commons. In Menzies' mind, there was apparently no question of 
disloyalty involved in such a switch. It was merely a natural progression 
in the path of a pohtical career that had been followed by several 
Austrahan politicians both before and after him. Just as a State 
politician today might move up to federal pohtics, so their predecessors 
might move up from federal politics to what they saw as imperial 
politics but which was really British politics. 
During the 1950s and sixties, with Menzies reconciled to his political 
exile from London and securely ensconced back in the Lodge, young 
Austrahans continued to follow in his footsteps, trekking to London 
in a rite of passage that sought to establish their identity in 'Kangaroo 
valley' before returning to settle for the rigours of life in the anonymity 
of Australian suburbia. 
More recently, young Australians have taken to trekking to Nepal 
or Bali, wandering in search of a national identity that continues to 
be elusive. At the same time, thousands of older British-Australians, 
perhaps the same ones who made Kangaroo Valley their temporary 
home in the 1950s, fly jumbo class to Heathrow seeking to satisfy 
themselves as to their origins before most of them are buried in a 
soil that remains, for many, alien and inhospitable. Others 
commemorate their retirement by setting off along Highway 1, the 
white man's bitumen dreaming path that circumnavigates the 
continent in confirmation of their proprietorship over it. 
Whether fingering through the parish records of an English church, 
driving the Nullarbor or visiting the Italian city of their birth, all these 
Australians are seeking in their different ways to affirm their 
connection to a continent in which they will eventually be buried. 
Some will choose not to be. Sir Sidney Nolan, whose work did so 
much to make connections between Europeans and the harsh colours 
and environment of the Australian continent, lived for much of his 
life in the gentle green surroundings of the English countryside and 
was buried there. 
This continuing search for a national identity is not a distraction, 
as some politicians sought unsuccessfully to convince us, but an 
obsession and one that has to be addressed. It found early expression 
in comments about native-born European Australians who were said 
by Governor King in 1802 to have the makings of a new society. In 
contrast to the convicts, predicted King, the so-called 'Currency lads 
and lasses' were the only ones who 'can be regarded as fixed to the 
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soil they have become natives of'.' They were thereby differentiated 
from their British-born parents. There was a sense of the land 
influencing the development of its people — making them physically 
tougher, more self-reliant, more independent. But while these early 
children of exiles remained physically fixed to the Australian soil, the 
allegiance of most remained fixed on Britain. 
Despite the brash assertiveness of the Bulletin in the 1890s, the sense 
of independent nationality necessarily remained an undercurrent in 
colonial life with native-born Australians remaining a minority of the 
population until the 1860s. At federation, it is likely that a majority 
of the population were either born in Britain or had parents who were 
born in Britain.* Anyway, as the life of Robert Menzies 
demonstrated, place of birth was no guarantee of national loyalty. 
Like Menzies, many native-born Australians retained an attachment 
to Britain as 'home' and of themselves as being British. This was partly 
cultural affinity and partly racial solidarity, a solidarity frozen by the 
cold fear of dispossession and glazed with the pride of belonging to 
the dominant European empire. 
While the sense of racial identity provided the central strand in the 
cord linking Australians to Britain, it was not without its 
complications. Mere possession of a British passport was hardly 
sufficient to qualify as a pukka sahib in Australian eyes since Indians, 
Afghans and other coloured colonials could flourish a stamp of 
approval from a glowering Queen Victoria. An ability to speak or 
write English would also hardly suffice since there were some Indians 
who could put many Australians to shame with their proficiency in 
English. Neither would the term 'European' satisfy as the basis of 
a common identifier since it included the dusky people of the 
Mediterranean. 
So it was that, in the final analysis, Australians defined themselves 
solely in terms of colour. It was not the 'British Australia' policy or 
the 'European Australia' policy but the 'white Australia' policy that 
provided the foundation for federation. For the next sixty years or 
more, entry to Australian society would be governed by the 'whiteness' 
or otherwise of an apphcant's face.^ 
But 'whiteness' alone was hardly a firm foundation for defining 
a sense of nationality. Combined with 'Britishness', however, it might 
just suffice. This was the 'Britishness' of Francis Drake and Lord 
Kitchener, of William Shakespeare and Rudyard Kipling, of military 
victory and cultural conquest. It was the 'Britishness' of an empire 
that awkwardly straddled the globe, thereby providing clear proof of 
British superiority, while also providing the defence guarantee upon 
which the security of the new Commonwealth depended. 
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It was with this unabashed combination of 'whiteness' and 
'Britishness' as unifying symbols that Australia came into existence 
in 1901 as a coalition of colonies, a state in search of a nation. Driving 
the coalition was a profound sense of outside threat from both Asia 
and the rising empires of Europe that it sought to stave off through 
the defensive barrier of the 'white Australia' policy and the protective 
power provided by its membership of a world-wide empire. To cut 
the British connection would open Austraha to an alien invader. Or 
so many Australians feared. 
While there were full-blooded, Australian nationalists in colonial 
times — the strident pages of the Bulletin are evidence enough for 
that — they remained little more than a discordant note in a 
predominantly British anthem. In fact, many Austrahans welcomed 
federation as the precurser to the further political integration of the 
empire, with Australian representatives possibly sitting in an imperial 
parliament, rather than federation being seen as another act in the 
empire's disintegration. The enthusiastic response of Australians to 
the Great War was further evidence of the distance which they had 
to travel along the road to nationhood, weighed down as they were 
with the baggage of a British past. 
If a nation was not conjured into being by the formation of the 
Commonwealth, when might this momentous event have occurred? 
It has become commonplace to argue that Australia was forged as 
a nation on the anvil of Gallipoli. Humphrey McQueen was far from 
the first, and certainly not the last, to argue as he did in A New 
Britannia that 
Only a mass sacrifice of individuals for the nation in defence of the 
Empire could bind together the hitherto diverse but nonetheless 
complementary strands of the Australian experience. Racism, 
democracy, nationalism, imperial loyalty, formed ranks to storm the 
parapets at Gallipoli. Only with their reconciliation could Australia 
become a nation.* 
But did it? How could nationalism and imperial loyalty be 
reconciled? What were the Australian soldiers fighting for? What did 
they think they were fighting for? 
Certainly, there was opportunity on the battlefield to notice 
distinctions between Australian and British troops. As one Australian 
army medic observed: 'The Tommies here are not making a good 
impression on Australians and there is no doubt they are not the same 
stamp of fellows as the Australians and New Zealanders. They haven't 
the stamina ... and they certainly won't or can't fight like our 
fellows'.' But usually the distinctions were made between Australian 
troops and British officers — a distinction of class rather than 
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nationality. In the event, the passing differences on the battlefield were 
smoothed over by the enduring similarities of culture, including the 
important factors of a common language and religion. There was also 
the joint allegiance to a British monarch and a sense of common racial 
identity revolving around being British, or was it English. 
There has been much argument in recent years about the role of 
the official Australian historian, C.W. Bean, in manufacturing the 
'digger' legend. For our purposes, its origins are largely irrelevant. 
What is relevant is the fact that it was adopted with such gusto by 
the Australian people. And while it may have been a mythical construct 
of a patriotic historian, it was an Australian myth that fitted into the 
imperial pantheon. The diggers earned glory in the desperate gullies 
of Gallipoli fighting for empire, not for Australia. 
As one wounded digger at Gallipoli was reported to have written, 
they were doing their 'bit to assist old England'. And in doing so, 
declared the Melbourne Argus, they had 'proved themselves worthy 
representatives of the race, and greater praise than this Britons cannot 
give to Britons'.'" While their participation in the Great War had 
revealed to some Australians a sense of themselves as different to the 
people of Britain, it did little to disturb their pre-existing allegiances 
— to Britain, to empire and to Australia. In October 1914, the future 
Australian politician, Harry Gullett, had proclaimed in the journal 
of the Royal Colonial Institute that Australia was at war for one reason 
alone: 
because Britain is at war. There is no reasoning about it; it is a matter 
not of head but of heart. We have merely answered the call of the race. 
We are fighting side by side with Britain because of our British 
blood." 
Twenty-five years later, and with Gullett in his Cabinet, the young 
Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, repeated these sentiments, 
albeit with less gusto than Gullett, when he committed Australia once 
again to another of Britain's European wars. 'If Great Britain was 
at war', intoned Menzies, 'Australia was a belligerent country'.'^ End 
of story. 
By his automatic declaration of war upon hearing of Britain's 
declaration on the BBC news, Menzies revealed that Australia still 
only had some of the characteristics of an independent state and even 
fewer characteristics of a nation. Some of the continuing limitations 
upon its independence as a state were legal limitations, such as those 
requiring Australian laws not to conflict with the laws of Britain; some 
were economic limitations, such as those requiring the Australian 
economy to be controlled largely by institutions centred upon the City 
of London; some were military limitations, such as those requiring 
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Australian defence to be meshed into the defence demands of the 
empire as decided by Britain; and some were cultural limitations, such 
as those that forced Australia to view the world through the eyes of 
the British Broadcasting Corporation and the British Foreign Office. 
Unable to enjoy a large measure of independent action as a state, the 
people of this continent had trouble recognising themselves as a 
distinctive nation rather than as a society of expatriate Britons. 
Despite the servility of Menzies' declaration of war, Australians 
were confronted with several dramatic challenges during the course 
of the ensuing conflict, any one of which had the potential to propel 
Australians out of their colonial mindset, with its view of Australia 
as a branch office of British Empire Incorporated, and to create a 
sense of Australian nationhood. Most dramatic, of course, was the 
threat to Australia's very existence posed by the Japanese, hovering 
off the nation's northern shore, a threat that was beaten off with great 
difficulty and only after much loss of life. Simultaneous with this 
climactic struggle were more subtle but no less dramatic challenges 
that threatened Australians' sense of themselves. 
Foremost among these was the British failure to fulfil its defence 
of Singapore; then there was the consequent reliance upon America 
for Australia's defence and the virtual occupation of Australian cities 
by American troops; and finally there was the challenge to national 
identity faced by hundreds of thousands of individual Australians 
serving in alien environments across the world. In the process of 
meeting these challenges, many Australians were forced to define 
themselves anew and, in so doing, to give greater definition to the 
still unfocussed sense of national identity. 
Ironically, Australia's abiding attachment to empire was the single 
most important cause of its weakness in 1939. The Dominion had 
men but no modern equipment with which to combat a determined 
foe. Her forces were led by British appointees who helped to ensure 
that Australian forces were used in ways that served British interests 
rather than Australian ones. Once again, an expeditionary force had 
been raised for overseas service and once again Australian ships were 
put under the command of the British Admiralty and sent far from 
Australian shores. Instead of developing an air force with modern 
aircraft capable of repelling an invasion, Australia was used as a 
training ground for airmen destined to fight Britain's battles overseas. 
Under the leadership of Robert Menzies, Australia largely accepted 
British priorities as her own. The Anglo-American strategy to fight 
Germany first in the event of a simultaneous European and Pacific 
war, was reached after talks in Washington in early 1941. Australia 
was not asked or consulted but informed of the strategy and readily 
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fell in with it despite the fact that it might leave the Dominion terribly 
exposed to the power of the Japanese. To the acclaim of the British, 
men like Menzies were taking the 'world view' rather than pursuing 
what were termed as narrow, national interests. Of course, the 'world 
view' was invariably what Washington and London declared it to be, 
as if those nations did not carefully pursue their own national interests 
throughout the war. 
More often than is usually acknowledged, John Curtin also fell in 
with the 'world view' of the war rather than follow a distinctive 
Australian path. As Prime Minister from October 1941, Curtin still 
relied upon the British to have both the power and the will to prevent 
the Japanese from sprawling all over the Pacific. Despite misgivings 
he had expressed as Opposition Leader about the Australian 
commitment to the Middle East, Curtin did nothing to withdraw 
Australia's three divisions from that region nor did he either withdraw 
or adequately reinforce the Australian division in Malaya. Instead, 
additional driblets of Australian forces were splashed about like so 
much fresh paint on the rotting outposts of empire. 
While Curtin is rightly celebrated for resisting Churchill over the 
diversion of Australian troops to Borneo, his retention of troops in 
the Middle East in late 1941, his stationing of troops on Ceylon in 
1942, his failure to end the commitment to the Empire Air Training 
Scheme and his virtual surrender of sovereignty to the Americans are 
all omitted from most popular assessments of his government. When 
Curtin did act in ways that might suggest an assertion of Australian 
nationhood — such as the belated ratification of the Statute of 
Westminster in late 1942 — it was specifically denied as having any 
such intention. It was not an occasion, Dr Evatt assured Billy Hughes, 
'for raising any issue such as Australia v. Britain'. Quite so, agreed 
Menzies, who argued that this major staging post on the road to 
independence was a technical legalism of 'relatively minor 
importance'." Apart from Hughes, both sides were eager for the 
legal advantages that ratification of the statute would bring while 
equally eager to disclaim any deeper significance for the move. In 
effect, they were denying Australian nationhood. 
By their often hysterical reactions to the Japanese threat, Australian 
leaders implicitly acknowledged that their society had not yet managed 
to transform itself into a distinctive nation that would survive even 
if its state was captured by the Japanese. In March 1942, the mercurial 
Minister for External Affiars, Dr H.V. Evatt, warned Churchill that 
Australia 'may have only six weeks to live', imploring the British leader 
to become the 'saviour of Australia' by preserving it from 'violation 
by yellow hordes'.'"' According to Evatt, invasion would equal the 
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death of Australia. Curtin agreed, warning at a dinner of the 
Commercial Travellers' Association in August 1942, that there was 
'nothing worth having in this land, whether it is the vested interests 
of capital or the vested interests of trade unionism or the vested 
interests of the Churches or anything else, which could survive a 
Japanese victory'.'' Hence the almost hysterical cry from the 
Australians to be rescued by the British. 
Not understanding the basis of the Australian fears, Churchill 
refused to help with practical British assistance or even to mollify the 
Australian fears. Apart from different strategic priorities making him 
deaf to Evatt's plea, Churchill assumed that Australia, like Britain, 
could survive as a nation the trauma of a possible invasion and 
occupation by hostile forces. Accordingly, he thought it sufficient to 
promise merely to retrieve Australia from Japanese occupation once 
the fight against Germany was finished. But this was the whole point. 
In the minds of Curtin and Evatt, the existence of the Australian 
nation was so tenuous that it would crumble under Japanese 
occupation, leaving no such entity as Australia for Britain to rescue. 
It would be just a group of exiled Britons requiring repatriation from 
the sullied soil of their adopted home. 
These anxious exchanges of early 1942 revealed the dark river of 
insecurity that coursed through the Australian psyche. The noted 
Australian writer, Vance Palmer, admitted as much in 1935 when he 
informed Australians that: 'We have to discover ourselves — our 
character, the character of our country, the particular kind of society 
that has developed here', suggesting that the agony of building a nation 
in the minds of Australians remained incomplete. Even that was 
contested by one critic who argued that an Australian was best defined 
simply as being 'a Briton resident in Australia' and that they had done 
little to leave their mark on the land: 'there are no ancient churches, 
castles, ruins — the memorials of generations departed'.'* 
In March 1942, while Evatt and Curtin were wrestling with Churchill 
to obtain the means for national salvation, Vance Palmer was wrestling 
with the imphcations of the crisis for Australia's sense of nationhood. 
Accepting the point of his earlier critic. Palmer now acknowledged 
that: 
We have no monuments to speak of, no dreams in stone, no Guernicas, no sacred 
places. We could vanish and leave singularly few signs that, for some generations, 
there had lived a people who had made a homeland of this Australian earth. 
He wondered, therefore, whether Australian society deserved to be 
spared from the Japanese. His answer, of course, was that it did since 
there was also an 'Australia of the spirit' which was not evidenced 
by ancient ruins but in the 'dreams of men who came here to form 
a new society'.'^ 
244 
But the British Australians hit back at any attempts to use the events 
of the war to drive a wedge between Britain and her loyal dominion 
and thereby promote a heightened sense of Australian nationalism. 
In a small booklet that became a bestseller in May 1942, the 
Archbishop of Brisbane rejected nationalist suggestions of a British 
betrayal over Singapore, affirming defiantly that Australians still 
regarded themselves 'come weal or come woe, as for ever a British 
people'.'" By his subsequent actions, Curtin implicitly accepted the 
Archbishop's pronouncement. 
Rather than using the war to advance the cause of nationhood, 
Curtin sought to preserve the tarnished emblems of empire — the 
anthem, the British Governor General, the system of imperial defence 
— while at the same time seeking an enhanced role for Australia within 
that empire. Under both Menzies and Curtin the war was a time of 
missed opportunities that left the creation of an Australian nation 
elusively out of reach. At its conclusion, the continent remained 
governed by a commonwealth of former colonies whose people still 
looked to Britain for their defining emblems. It remained an Australian 
state peopled by a nation mainly of Britons, even though, hke Menzies, 
they might happen to be born in Australia." 
Although Australia did emerge from the war more confident and 
more assertive, it remained the assertiveness of a dominion fixed within 
a British orbit. In 1939, the conservative Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies had claimed that 'we maintain our independent existence 
primarily because we belong to a family of nations'. In other words, 
Australia was nothing without Britain. Six years later, after the 
upheavals of war, the socialist Prime Minister John Curtin still claimed 
that Australia's foreign policy 'must always be in harmony with that 
of the British Commonwealth as a whole', reminding his audience 
that Australia's 'articulation in the world would be more impressive 
as a member of a family than it could ever be if we made it as a 
separate and distinct entity'.^" 
Accordingly, the Duke of Gloucester was nominated by Curtin to 
become Australia's Governor-General in a most practical display of 
imperial loyalty. Likewise, Curtin resisted moves to have Advance 
Australia Fair played in wartime cinemas, observing that he did 'not 
know of any anthem other than the National Anthem, God Save the 
King'.'' 
The effective American occupation of Australia during the Second 
World War might have been expected to attentuate the links between 
Australia and Britain. And of course it did to some extent. But the 
effect was less marked and more gradual than is often suggested and 
did not necessarily lead to a greater sense of their own nationhood 
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by Australians. Instead, dependency upon Britain was exchanged for 
dependency upon the United States while the cause of nationhood 
advanced by slow degrees, restrained by additional fears thrown up 
by the Cold War. 
Canberra's Anglican Bishop, E.H. Burgmann, had urged his fellow 
Australians in 1944 to put aside one of their fears — the fear of 
continental European immigrants — which was based, so he claimed, 
'in the fact that we do not feel sure of ourselves'. The wartime threat 
from the Japanese had made the fear of Europeans one too many 
for Australians to sustain if they were to ensure their future security. 
'We shall never be a nation', Burgmann argued, 'unless we become 
positive and unfearful in our sentiments and thoughts'.^^ But fear 
continued to stalk the policymakers of Canberra. 
The 'one lesson' that Australians had learned from the war, observed 
the Immigration Minister, Arthur Calwell, as the conflict drew to a 
conclusion, was that 'we cannot continue to hold our island continent 
for ourselves and our descendants unless we greatly increase our 
numbers'. Predicting that there could be 'a further formidable 
challenge within the next quarter of a century to our right to hold 
this land', Calwell called on Australians 'to make the best possible 
use of our second chance to survive'.^' And they were to do it 
themselves by procreating as well as by encouraging immigration on 
a scale hitherto unforeseen. 
The call to populate or perish was taken up by the conservative 
politician, Richard Casey, whose words revealed how little had been 
done during the war to break Australia free from the British mould. 
In his book Double or Quit, Casey appealed in 1949 for a 
centrifugal movement from Britain to the outer reaches of the 
Commonwealth and Empire, of people, industries and capital, which 
would lessen the pressure of existence on the people of Britain and at 
the same time build up the Dominions and Colonies. It may well be 
that a considerable part of the future of the British race will lie in 
Australia.^ " 
Ironically, Casey's comments were written at the very time that 
Austraha was being forced to look to continental Europe for migrants. 
While the massive postwar immigration program was directed 
predominantly at Britain in order that Australia might remain both 
white and British, it soon turned to Europe once it was clear that 
the British were not coming forth in sufficient numbers. Australia 
looked firstly to northern Europe and then to central Europe and, 
before long, to southern Europe. And what a confused sense of 
nationhood we must have presented to these migrants as their 
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citizenship of Australia was confirmed in so many community halls, 
watched over by a photograph of Elizabeth Windsor hanging from 
walls bedecked with a flag that had the British ensign as its most 
prominent feature. 
Apart from these potent symbols of our historic link to Britain, 
it has been their connection to the continent that has done most to 
define Australians as a people. And it was the Second World War that 
saw this connection in danger of being severed for the first time. In 
the darkest days of 1942, Vance Palmer had predicted bravely that 
we will come out of this struggle battered, stripped to the bone, but 
spiritually sounder than we went in, surer of our essential character, 
adults in a wider world than the one we lived in hitherto." 
His confidence was over-stated. Australia jibbed at the effort required 
to become independent. It remained a state in search of a nation, 
a people divided between those looking esentially to their own 
strengths for salvation and those seeking salvation across the seas, 
whether in London or Washington or Moscow. 
Over the succeeding years, and despite the resistance of Bob 
Menzies, the evolution of an Australian nation continued to mature 
in the minds of its citizens, helped along by the arrival of non-British 
migrants, the abandonment of the 'white Austraha' policy, the trauma 
of Vietnam and of Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez and her 
attempts to enter the Common Market. The changes in the Australian 
outlook were seen most dramatically during the Whitlam years when 
a new national self-confidence was clearly evident, standing in stark 
contrast to the earlier colonial mentality and the 'waltzing with 
Washington' years. 
The assertions of independence during the Whitlam years had 
confirmed the underlying reality, that a nation of exiled Britons was 
being transformed largely into a nation of Australians. Now, some 
fifty years on from the Second World War, and nearly a century since 
federation, the maturing of Australia's national consciousness is 
reaching hs final flowering in the coming republic, with the swelling 
republican chorus drowning out the death rattle of the remaining 
monarchists. 
Patrick White once observed that 'Australia will never acquire a 
national identity until enough individual Australians acquire an 
identity of their own'.^ * With the creation of a republic, there will be 
no constitutional barrier to them fully expressing their identity as 
Australians. They will finally achieve what Edmund Barton vainly tried 
to proclaim into existence in 1901: a nation for a continent. 
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